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CRIMINAL LAW
NANCY HOLLANDER* and KARI CONVERSE**

I. SUBSTANTIVE STATUTORY CHANGES
AFFECTING NEW MEXICO CRIMINAL LAWS
The 1984 New Mexico Legislature' made numerous substantive changes
in the area of criminal law. It created several new crimes, increased the
penalties for existing crimes, rewrote sentencing provisions for both adults
and juveniles, and made significant changes affecting crimes, penalties,
and administrative procedures relating to charges of driving while intoxicated.
A. New Crimes
The 1984 Legislature enacted a completely new section in the New
Mexico criminal code entitled the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act. 2
This act makes it a fourth degree felony for anyone to distribute or to
possess with the intent to distribute for profit any visual or print medium
depicting certain prohibited sexual acts if one or more of the participants
in the act is under sixteen years of age.3 The sexual acts prohibited by
the act include sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse for the purpose of sexual stimulation, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals. 4
The new act also makes it a crime for anyone to permit a child under
sixteen to engage in any of these prohibited sexual acts knowing or having
a reason to know that the act may be recorded in a visual or print medium
or performed publicly.5 Both the sexual act and simulation of the sexual
act are prohibited. 6 Anyone violating this section is guilty of a fourth
degree felony unless the child involved is under thirteen, in which case
the crime is a third degree felony.7
*J.D., University of New Mexico, 1978; Associate, Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, Albuquerque,
New Mexico.
**Member, Class of 1985, University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. 36th Legislature, 2nd Session, 1984.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§30-6A-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
3. Id. § 30-6A-3(A).
4. Id. § 30-6A-2(A).
5. Id. § 30-6A-3(B),(C).
6. Id. § 30-6A-3.
7. Id. § 30-6A-3(B).
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If the child performs the sexual act for the violator's profit, the violator
is guilty of a third degree felony, or in the case of a child under thirteen,
a second degree felony.' Anyone who manufactures any visual or print
medium depicting these prohibited sexual acts utilizing participants under
sixteen years of age is guilty of a third degree felony.9
The act further makes it a crime to encourage or to promote children
under the age of sixteen to engage in prostitution,' 0 or to hire or offer to
hire a child between the ages of thirteen and sixteen to engage in any
prohibited sexual act." A violation for these provisions is a third degree
felony unless the child is under the age of thirteen, in which case the
crime is a second degree felony. 12
Parents or guardians who knowingly permit their children to engage
in acts for the purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting
the prohibited sexual acts get off rather lightly under this scheme as the
offense is a fourth degree felony. 3 New Mexico law requires that one be
charged with the most specific crime.' 4 If one can prove he is a parent
or guardian of a child who allegedly engaged in one of the prohibited
sexual acts and it was for the purpose of preserving the act on film or in
print, he can argue that he must be charged under this section, limiting
his exposure to a fourth degree felony.
B. Increased Penalties
The bill which contained the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act also
increased the penalty for certain types of child abuse. '" Abuse of a child
that does not result in the child's death or great bodily harm to the child
had been a fourth degree felony. It remains a fourth degree felony for
the first offense, but is now a second degree felony for subsequent offenses. 6 If the abuse does result in the child's death or great bodily harm,
the first offense is now a second degree felony and second and subsequent
offenses are first degree felonies.
8. Id. § 30-6A-3(C).
9. Id. § 30-6A-3(D).

10. Id. § 30-6A-4(A).
11. Id. § 30-6A-4(B).

12. Id. §30-6A-4(A).
13. Id. §30-6A-4(C).
14. "The courts in New Mexico have long adhered to the rule that where both a general and a
specific statute condemn the same offense, the State must prosecute under the specific statute." State
v. Reams, 98 N.M. 372, 375, 648 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.M.
215, 647 P.2d 417 (1981).
15. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
16. Id. § 30-6-1(C).
17. Id. The legislature passed another bill, Senate Bill 139, which also amended § 30-6-1. This
bill was inconsistent with the bill that was codified, House Bill 199. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-1-8 (1978)
provides that if two or more acts are enacted during the same session of the legislature amending
the same set of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, the act last signed by the Governor shall be
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C. Sentencing Changes
The legislature also amended section 31-19-1 to require that a defendant
convicted of a misdemeanor be placed on either supervised or unsupervised probation for at least some portion of the period of any deferred
or suspended sentence.' 8 The prior formulation of the statute gave the
sentencing judge the option of including probation with a deferred or
suspended sentence. That option continues to apply to judges sentencing
for felony convictions. 9 In addition, the legislature amended the statutes
to extend the requirements relating to probation and the conditions of
orders deferring or suspending sentences to magistrate and metropolitan
courts.2" Previously there was no clear authority for magistrate and metropolitan court judges to sentence a defendant to probation, although they
have been doing so for a good many years.2
These amendments create a conflict between two sections of the statute. 22 One section provides that the magistrate, metropolitan, or district
court shall order a defendant to be placed on probation "if the defendant
is in need of supervision, guidance or direction that is feasible for the
probation service to furnish." 2 3 This language conflicts with the section
that requires probation for some portion of any suspended or deferred
misdemeanor sentence, without any qualification.24
The legislature also provided for mandatory alcohol and drug abuse
screening and treatment for juvenile offenders upon certain findings by
the children's court. 25 Whenever that court finds that a child has violated
any ordinance or statute proscribing driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs, the court shall order the child to report to
an alcohol or drug abuse bureau of the state for screening and, if necessary,
for treatment. This referral is mandatory and does not require a hearing
or finding on the issue of need for care and rehabilitation. After a child
is discharged by the alcoholism or drug abuse bureau or completes a
period of supervision, any petition for an offense based upon the same
conduct must be dismissed with prejudice. This amendment contains a
sunset clause and is in effect only through July 1, 1985.
presumed to be the law. Apparently, House Bill 199 was signed last, although the Governor signed
both bills on the same day.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-19-1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
19. Id. § 31-20-5.
20. Id. §§ 31-20-5 to -6. See also Slusher, Criminal Procedure, 15 N.M. L. Rev. (1985), in
this issue.
21. See N.M. Institute of Public Law, Magistrate Bench Book (R. Cosgrove ed. 1975).
22. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-5 (Cum. Supp. 1984) with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-19-1
(Cum. Supp. 1984).
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-5 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
24. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-19-1 (Cum. Supp. 1984). In practice, most judges include probation
in all sentences and limit it to unsupervised probation where there is no genuine need for supervision
or guidance.
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D. Laws Involving Driving Offenses
The statutes involving driving while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs (DWI) and the administrative procedures related to the driving
offenses that might cause one to lose his driver's license underwent drastic
rewriting during the 1984 session of the legislature. The results are a
confusing set of statutes, the meaning of which will undoubtedly require
court interpretation.
New Mexico law previously required that anyone convicted of three
DWI offenses subsequent to July 1, 1955 could not be licensed until five
years after the third conviction.26 The section now contains the additional
proviso that one must not have been subsequently convicted of DWI
during the five-year period prior to his request for restoration of his
license. This amendment fills a gap in the previous statute that allowed
for the possibility that someone could be convicted of DWI three times
and then, after five years had passed, apply for a license even though
during that five-year period he had been convicted of DWI a fourth time.
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the statute also provided that a person
would never be granted another New Mexico driver's license if he was
convicted three times, lost his license for five years, had his license
restored, and then was subsequently convicted of DWI.27 This section
the five-year revocation
now provides that one subsequent conviction 2after
8
results in an additional five-year revocation.
The legislature also amended section 66-5-29, entitled "Mandatory
Revocation of License by Division, ' 29 to require the motor vehicle division to revoke the license of any driver adjudicated as a delinquent for
3
certain driving offenses. Adjudication as a delinquent is not a conviction. °
not
Prior to this amendment, section 66-5-29 applied only to convictions,
to juveniles who were adjudicated delinquents for the enumerated offenses.
The legislature also changed the section involving limitations on guilty
pleas. If the blood alcohol level of the person charged contains at least
by weight of alcohol, that person is no longer allowed to plead
10%
1
guilty to any charge other than DWI. 3 The previous maximum blood
alcohol level under this section was. 15%. This change goes in conjunc25. N.M. Stat. Ann. §32-1-31 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-5-5 (1978).
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-5(D) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
28. Under the statutory scheme, prior to 1984 it was quite routine to secure a limited license to
drive to work. Even if one lost his license forever, he could still get to and from work. Under the
new scheme there are no limited licenses for subsequent DWI offenders. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-535(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
29. Id. § 66-5-29.
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-33 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-102.1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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tion with section 66-8-110(C), which states that "if the blood of the
person tested contains 10% or more by weight of alcohol, the arresting
officer shall charge him with a violation of §66-8-102 N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1978). ,32
Perhaps the most far-reaching amendment, and the one likely to have
devastating effects on persons who must drive to maintain their employment, is the one that provides for mandatory license revocation. A law
enforcement officer must submit an affidavit stating that the officer upon
probable cause arrested the person for DWI, that the person submitted
to chemical testing, and that the results indicated. 10% or more by weight
of alcohol in the person's blood if eighteen years or older or .05% or
more if less than eighteen years, or if the person refused to submit to a
blood alcohol test, that he had been advised that failure to submit could
result in revocation of his driving privilege.
The time periods for the revocation are: ninety days if the person is
eighteen years of age or older; six months if the person is less than
eighteen years of age and has not previously had his license revoked
pursuant to the provisions of the section; and, one year if the person is
less than eighteen years of age and has previously had his license revoked
pursuant to the provisions of the section or if the person refused to submit
to a blood alcohol test. Furthermore, if a person is a resident of New
Mexico or will become a resident within a year and does not have a
license to operate a motor vehicle in this state, he shall not receive one
for the period of time that his license would have been revoked had he
been a licensed New Mexico driver.' 4
If a person loses his license under one of these conditions, he will
immediately be issued a written notice of the revocation and of the right
to a hearing. The officer will confiscate the license and issue a temporary
license valid for thirty days (assuming the person has a valid license or
permit to begin with). The affected person must request a hearing within
ten days after the receipt of the notice of revocation; the hearing must
be set for a date no later than thirty days after receipt of the notice and
must be held in the county where the offense took place.35 Essentially
the same procedure follows whether the person refuses to submit to a test
or submits to a test that could result in revocation.
At the hearing, the director must make certain findings pursuant to the
statute. These findings are limited to the following issues:
1. Whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to
32. Id. §66-8-110(C).
33. Id. §66-8-111.
34. Id. §66-8-111(C).
35. Id. § 66-8-112. If the results of the chemical test cannot be obtained immediately, the Motor
Vehicle Department sends the notice of revocation.
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believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle within this
state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2. Whether the person was arrested;
3. Whether the hearing was held no later than thirty days after notice
of revocation or no later than ninety days after notice of revocation
if the hearing has been extended pursuant to subsection C of the
section; and
4. Whether: (a) the person refused to submit to a test upon a request
of the law enforcement officer after the law enforcement officer
advised the motorist that the failure to submit to a test could result
in revocation of the motorist's privilege to drive; or (b) the chemical
tests were administered pursuant to the provisions of the Implied
Consent Act;36 and the test results indicated a blood alcohol content
of. 10% or more by weight if the person is eighteen years of age
or older or a blood alcohol content of .05% or more by weight if
the person is less than eighteen years of age. 37
If the hearing is based on a refusal to take a chemical test, the officer
must show that the offender failed to submit to the test upon request of
the law enforcement officer after the officer advised him that his failure
to submit could result in revocation of his license.38
The distinction in the statute between children and adults which assumes that children become impaired at .05% instead of .10% blood
alcohol content will undoubtedly lead to litigation to test its constitutionality.39 Further, the statute's heightened emphasis on controlling the
drunk driver and the severity of the penalties, both criminal and administrative, will no doubt result in new, creative defenses. The state will
find itself forced to prove the accuracy of its alcohol breath tests40 and
the accuracy of the presumptions upon which the chemical tests rely,
including the conversion ratio from blood alcohol to breath alcohol 4 and
the assumption that a test result showing .10% blood alcohol content
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-105 to -112 (1978).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-112(E) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
38. Id.
39. As age has not been recognized as a suspect classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny,
this statute must rationally further a legitimate state purpose or interest. Texas Woman's Univ. v.
Chayklintaste, 530 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1975). In the criminal context, age classifications have been
upheld regarding rape in Owens v. Wainwright, 698 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 117 (1983); regarding curfew in Dillon v. Downes, 401 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. Va. 1975);
regarding license suspensions in State v. Damiano, 142 N.J. Super. 457, 361 A.2d 631 (1976); and
regarding treatment of 17-year-old offenders as adults in Benavidez v. State, 655 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983).
40. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-22 (Supp. 1981), setting out the requirements for state approval
of evidential breath tests.
41. The standard used is 1:2100. It is assumed that there is as much alcohol in one part blood
as in 2100 parts of breath. See The Constitutionality of Chemical Test Presumptions of Intoxication
and Motor Vehicle Statutes, 20 San Diego L. Rev. 301 (1983).
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demonstrates that the suspect had a.10% blood alcohol level at the time
he was driving.42
The driving privileges allowed New Mexico drivers upon suspension
or revocation of their licenses have been severely limited.43 Once a license
is suspended or revoked following conviction or adjudication as a delinquent under any law, ordinance, or regulation relating to motor vehicles,
"a person may apply to the director [of the motor vehicle division] for
a license or permit to drive limited to use allowing him to engage in
gainful employment. "" This sounds promising but excludes almost everyone. If one refuses to take a blood alcohol test, he is not eligible to apply
for a limited license.45 Anyone previously convicted of DWI, likewise,
is not eligible for a limited license.' The only persons convicted of DWI
who can apply for limited licenses are first offenders. But a first offender
will lose his license for only ninety days.47 It appears, therefore, that
very few persons convicted of DWI are eligible for a limited license.4
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Abuse of a Peace Officer
State v. Wade49 involved the interpretation of the meaning of the statutory phrase "abusing any ...peace officer."' The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the word "abusing" applies to speech in addition
to physical acts. This legislative prohibition of speech is permissible so
long as the statute does not offend the first and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution.5 1 The New Mexico court correctly found
that the only "words" the legislature can prohibit without infringing upon
the defendant's first amendment rights are "fighting words," as defined
by the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:5 2
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob42. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §66-8-102 (Cum. Supp. 1984). See also Driving with 0.10% Blood
Alcohol: Can the State Prove It?, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 819 (1982).
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-35 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
44. Id. § 66-5-29.
45. Under the old statute, one could refuse a blood alcohol test but plead guilty within 30 days
as a first offender and keep his license. That section has been deleted.
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5-35(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
47. Id. §66-8-111.
48. The Motor Vehicle Division does have authority to suspend or to revoke licenses in circumstances not related to DWI. This appears to remain unaffected by the new amendments. See id. § 665-30.
49. 100 N.M. 152, 667 P.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1983).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1(D).
51. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
52. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or intend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
The Wade court held, therefore, that the "'abusing' speech in section
54
30-22-1(D). . . covers only speech that can be called 'fighting' words."
The evidence showed that the defendant was upset at a police intrusion
into a family argument. He screamed obscenities, waved his arms around,
and yelled. "Screaming obscenities and yelling 'get the hell out of the
house' do not amount to 'fighting' words, particularly when they are
55
addressed to police officers, who are supposed to exercise restraint.
According to the court, any other interpretation of section 30-22-1(D)
would render the section unconstitutional .56 Having so stated, the court
went on to find that the evidence was not sufficient to show that the
defendant used fighting words. In other words, there was no evidence
that the defendant intended to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
The court compared its previous decision in City of Alamogordo v.
Orlich,58 where the court reversed a conviction for disorderly conduct
under an Alamogordo ordinance after the defendant shouted at a policeman words which indicated that he believed the policeman to be an
6
incestuous child of a female dog. 59 The court also relied on State v. Doe, '
where the defendant's conduct of questioning the police in a loud voice
as to why he had been stopped and clenching his fists was not deemed
sufficient to establish the fighting words exception.
B. Escape
State v. Coleman6 involved the construction of the statute prohibiting
escape from jail.62 Coleman had been lawfully committed to the Eddy
County jail and placed on work release with a private roofing firm. One
evening he failed to return to the jail from his employment. The defendant
contended that leaving a job site while on a work release program did
not come within the meaning of "escape from jail" under the statute.
The court disagreed, finding that there were only two essential elements
53. Id. at 571-72.
54. 100 N.M. at 153, 667 P.2d at 460.
55. Id. at 155, 667 P.2d at 462.
56. Id. at 154, 667 P.2d at 461.
57. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
58. 95 N.M. 725, 625 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1981); see Hollander, Criminal Law, 13 N.M.L.
Rev. 323, 326-28 (1983).
59. 95 N.M. at 726, 625 P.2d at 1243.
60. 92 N.M. 109, 583 P.2d 473 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 92 N.M. 100, 583 P.2d 464
(1978).
61. 101 N.M. 252, 680 P.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1984).
62. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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that must be proved: that the defendant was committed to jail and that
the defendant escaped from jail.63 The court found it only reasonable to
conclude that while on work release the defendant was still in jail for all
intents and purposes. Thus, this case was no different than State v. Gilman, 64 where the defendant had escaped from the county fairgrounds
while on a work detail. Although Gilman was under the direct supervision
of a guard and Coleman was not, the court found the distinction neither
persuasive nor relevant.
C. School Attendance
In State v. Edgington,65 the court interpreted the statute requiring compulsory school attendance.' The district court had granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the statute violated
the equal protection clause of the United States and the New Mexico
Constitutions. The court of appeals disagreed. The court found that strict
scrutiny was not required because education is not a fundamental right
and, therefore, only a rational relation test was necessary. 67 This statute,
8
therefore, did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights.
D. Child Abuse
State v. Williams69 involved an attack on the sufficiency of evidence
on behalf of a woman convicted of child abuse on the grounds that it
violated her right to due process. Her conviction was based on a section
of the child abuse statute permitting guilt to be found on a standard of
negligence:70 that she negligently placed the child in a situation that could
endanger his health. There was no evidence that the defendant had abused
her child, only that she knew her husband had abused her child and that
she had a duty to care for and protect her child from her husband.7 The
court found that her failure to seek help for her child was the proximate
cause of the child's injuries.72 The decision is disturbing because it stretches
63. See N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 22.21.
64. 97 N.M. 67, 636 P.2d 886 (Ct. App. 1981); see Hollander, supra note 58, at 325-26.
65. 99 N.M. 715, 663 P.2d 374 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983).
See Note, Compulsory SchoolAttendance-Who Directs the Educationof a Child: State v. Edgington,
14 N.M.L. Rev. 453 (1984).
.66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
67. 99 N.M. at 718, 663 P.2d at 377; see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
reh'g denied, 93 S. Ct. 1919 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131
(1982); Denis J. O'Connell High School v. Virginia High School, 581 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1978); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct.
App. 1983).
68. 99 N.M. at 719, 663 P.2d at 378.
69. 100 N.M. 322, 670 P.2d 122 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735 (1983).
70. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-6-1(C)(1).
71. 100 N.M. at 324, 670 P.2d at 124.
72. Id.
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criminal liability beyond acceptable limits. It makes simple negligence
the standard for criminal activity" and it fails to take into account the
realities of a situation where a pregnant woman, herself the object of her
husband's brutality, fails to take steps to stop him from injuring her child.74
E. Forfeiture
An intriguing case is State v. Stevens,75 which involved an interpretation
of the statute delineating items subject to forfeiture under the Controlled
Substances Act.76 The court focused on the grammatical construction of
the statute: "All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels,
which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property described
in subsections A or B. .

.

. "" The question raised was whether the vehicle

actually need be used for the purpose of transporting the controlled substance. This case involved the interpretation of the restrictive clause "for
the purpose of sale." Based on the location of the commas, the court
found that the clause "for the purpose of sale" restricted the phrase "or
in any manner to facilitate transportation," but did not restrict the phrase
"to transport." The car involved in Stevens, therefore, could be seized
under this statute because it facilitated the transportation for the purpose
of sale of property. It was not necessary that the car actually transport
the drugs (which it obviously did not).7
F. Embezzlement
The supreme court held that numerous small embezzlements can sustain
one third degree embezzlement conviction in State v. Pedroncelli.9 Pedroncelli was secretary-treasurer of a union and over a period of six months,
cashed twenty-two checks and made fourteen cash withdrawals totalling
$16,571.00. She was charged with a third degree felony of embezzlement
over $2,500 and found guilty.8 0 The court of appeals reversed, saying
"the evidence . . . prove[d] 36 separate acts of embezzlement of more
73. More than simple negligence is normally required for criminal culpability. People v. Warner
Lambert Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 159, 414 N.E.2d 660 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Tackett, 299 Ky. 731, 187 S.W.2d 297 (1945); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55
N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944).
74. Although this statute was substantially amended during the 1984 session of the legislature,
this particular section survived intact. The section was deleted by amendment but that amendment
did not become law. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). See supra note 17.
75. 100 N.M. 577, 673 P.2d 1310 (1983).
76. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-34 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
77. Id. § 30-31-34(D).
78. 100 N.M. at 579, 673 P.2d at 1312.
79. 100 N.M. 678, 675 P.2d 127 (1984).
80. Id. at 679, 675 P.2d at 128. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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than $100 but less than $2,500, all fourth degree felonies"'" and remanded
for entry of a judgment of guilty on one count of fourth degree embezzlement. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
successive conversions may constitute
8 2 one crime of larceny if there is
one single sustained criminal intent.
The court approved the holding in State v. Allen, 3 that the issue of
whether takings are part of a single criminal scheme or multiple offenses
is a question for the jury to decide. "The factfinder may ...evaluate
the evidence to determine if one protracted intention accompanies the
several takings or conversions that may be implicated within a single
charge. "84
The court also held that the single evidence test for double jeopardy
would preclude the state from bringing separate fourth degree charges on
each of the thirty-six separate acts of embezzlement in addition to the
third degree charge." The same evidence test is whether the facts offered
in support of one offense would sustain a conviction of the other.86 Therefore, the state apparently would be prevented from charging thirty-six
fourth degree felonies or one third degree felony, but must charge one
crime of embezzlement, either a third or a fourth degree felony. The court
of appeals' reliance on Sanchez v. State,87 was misplaced, because although Sanchez was an analogous factual situation, the reversal of the
conviction in Sanchez was based upon the vagueness of the indictment,
not on the single larceny doctrine.
G. Burglary
In State v. Rodriguez,"8 the state charged the defendant with burglary
for reaching into the open uncovered bed of a pickup truck and taking a
tool box. 89 The court of appeals held that reaching into the bed of a pickup
truck constitutes "entry" within the meaning of burglary as defined in
N.M. Stat. Ann. section 30-16-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
Judge Bivins noted that most of the elements of common law burglary'
have been eliminated, leaving only the elements of entry and intent.
81. 100 N.M. at 682, 675 P.2d at 131.
82. Id. at 680, 675 P.2d at 129.
83. 59 N.M. 139, 280 P.2d 298 (1955).
84. 100 N.M. at 681, 675 P.2d at 130.
85. Id.
86. State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975); Owens v. Abram, 58 N.M. 682, 274
P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955).
87. 97 N.M. 445, 640 P.2d 1325 (1982).
88. 101 N.M. 192, 679 P.2d 1290 (Ct. App. 1984).
89. Id. at 193, 679 P.2d at 1291.
90. Breaking, entering, a dwelling house, of another, at night, with the intent to commit a felony.
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Although the legislature has expanded the definition of burglary, "[tihe
9
rationale underlying the expansion . . . remains somewhat unclear.' '
The touchstone of burglary, distinguishing it from theft, has traditionally been the invasion of some zone of expected inviolability or privacy. 92
While "entry" has been construed to include merely inserting a hand or
arn,9 it is difficult to imagine the bed of a pickup truck as the sort of
inviolate space that burglary statutes seek to protect.
Other jurisdictions have split on the identical question. In People v.
Romero94 the Colorado Supreme Court held that under Colorado law
reaching into the back of a pickup truck constituted entry. On the other
hand, in Smith v. FirstJudicialDistrict Court,95 the court held that reaching into the back of a pickup truck did not constitute burglary within the
meaning of the Nevada statutes,96 despite the statutory definition of "entry" as "the entrance of the offender, or the insertion of any part of his
body." 97 Thus, under a technical definition of "entry," reaching into the
bed of a pickup truck can constitute burglary. The better-reasoned decisions, however, consider this activity to be outside the intended reach of
the burglary statutes.
In State v. Jennings98 the court of appeals reworked the definition of
possession of burglary tools 9 by eliminating the requirement that the tools
be those commonly used as burglary tools. Jennings and a co-defendant
were observed attempting to enter into a closed filling station. They were
arrested. During the search pursuant to the arrest, officers found a screw
driver in Jenning's possession and a flashlight in his co-defendant's possession. Both were convicted of, inter alia, possession of burglary tools.
The defendants appealed their convictions based on the lack of proof of
the common use of tools for burglary and lack of proof of intent to use
the tools in the commission of the burglary. The court of appeals initially
91. Id. at 194, 679 P.2d at 1292.
92. "It is an offense against the security of habitation or occupancy, rather than against ownership
or property." 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 326 (14th ed. 1980). Under the Model Penal Code, "[t]he
offense has thus been limited ... to the invasion of premises under circumstances especially likely
to terrorize the occupants . .. [and this] narrows the offense to reflect more appropriately the
distinctive situation for which it was originally devised." Model Penal Code § 221.1, commentary
at 67 (1980).
93. See Mirich v. State, 593 P.2d 590 (Wyo. 1979); People v. Failla, 414 P.2d 39, 51 Cal. Rptr.
103 (1966); State v. Maddox, 465 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1971).
94. 179 Colo. 159, 499 P.2d 604 (1972).
95. 75 Nev. 526, 347 P.2d 526 (1959).
96. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.060 (1983) states: "Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel,
vehicle, vehicle trailer, semi-trailer or house trailer, or railroad car, with the intent to commit grand
or petit larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary."
97. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.010(8) (1983).
98. 102 N.M. 94, 691 P.2d 882 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 88, 691 P.2d 881 (1984).
99. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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held that "the issue of whether items are commonly used for burglaries
is a factual one to be decided by the jury,"'" but concluded that "in view
of evidence of actual use, evidence that flashlights and screw drivers are
commonly used burglariously is unnecessary. "'01 This holding appears to
eliminate one element of the offense. N.M. Stat. Ann. section 30-16-5
defines the crime of possession of burglary tools as "having in the person's
possession a device or instrumentality designed or commonly used for
the commission of burglary and under circumstances evincing an intent
to use the same in commission of burglary." N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 16.23
instructs for this crime: "1. The defendant had in his possession (name
tools or devices), which are designed for or commonly used in commission
of a burglary."
Proof of common use was previously held to be a requirement for
conviction in State v. Najera,1o2 where the court of appeals held that
[O]ne is exposed to criminal sanctions if one: (1) possesses an instrumentality or device, (2) the instrumentality or device is designed
or commonly used to commit burglary, and (3) the instrumentality
or device is possessed under circumstances evincing an intent to use
the instrumentality or device in committing burglary.' 03
In Jennings, the court instead analogized to two recent cases involving
deadly weapons. In State v. Candelaria,1"othe court held that the use of
a screwdriver constituted assault with a deadly weapon under a statute
that reads: "Aggravated assault consists of. . .unlawfully assaulting or
striking at another with a deadly weapon. "' 5 In State v. Blea," an icepick
in the defendant's possession constituted the element of carrying a deadly
weapon within the meaning of an ordinance that defined "deadly weapon"
as
any firearm or any weapon which is capable of producing death or
great bodily harm, including but not restrictedto, any type of dagger,
metalic knuckles, switchblade, ponyard, dirk knife, sword cane,
sharp pointed cane or rod, slingshot, bludgeon, knumchucks, straight
razor, or slapper.'07
In these cases, convictions were justified by the lack of definition in
Candelariaand the non-inclusive definition in Blea. "Common use," on
the other hand, appears as part of the statute and part of the uniform jury
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

102 N.M. at 96, 691 P.2d at 884.
Id. at 97, 691 P.2d at 885 (emphasis in original).
89 N.M. 522, 554 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1976).
89 N.M. at 523, 554 P.2d at 984.
97 N.M. 64, 636 P.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1981).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-12(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
100 N.M. 237, 668 P.2d 1114 (Ct. App. 1983).
Crim. Code of Albuquerque § 2-8(B) (1978) (emphasis added).
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instruction. As a result of the holding in Jennings, the supreme court will
need to clarify whether evidence of actual use can substitute for evidence
of common use in a conviction for possession of burglary tools.
In State v. Ross,' °8 the court of appeals decided that breaking and
entering into a garage"° is not necessarily a lesser included offense of
burglary of a dwelling house."' Because the defendant requested a jury
instruction on breaking and entering as a lesser included offense, however,
he could not appeal his conviction on that charge.
Ross was indicted by a grand jury on burglary of a dwelling house.
The evidence showed that he had been observed trying to enter a garage
that was not attached to a house. "' At trial, the court gave the defendant's
requested instructions on, inter alia, breaking and entering. l2 Ross was
found guilty of breaking and entering; he appealed the sufficiency of the
evidence, the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict on burglary of a
dwelling house, and the giving of the jury instruction on breaking and
entering. The court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient for
a conviction of breaking and entering and that the acquittal on burglary
of a dwelling house precluded a claim of error on the failure to direct a
verdict. "3
"A lesser included offense is one which is comprised of some, but not
all, of the elements of a greater offense, and which does not have any
element not included in the greater offense so that it is not possible to
commit the greater offense without committing the lesser offense.""'
"Breaking" is no longer a part of the definition of burglary in New
Mexico."' Therefore, under the facts of Ross, "breaking and entering
was not a lesser included offense of the charge of burglary. "116 The court
held that under some facts, such as entry by fraud, breaking and entering
could still constitute a lesser included offense. "1'The "[d]efendant having
urged the court to adopt an instruction upon the offense of breaking and
entering [however] will not be heard on appeal 8 to claim that ... his
conviction of breaking and entering was error.""1
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
(1978);
116.
117.
118.

100 N.M. 48, 665 P.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1983).
Breaking and entering is defined in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-14-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
100 N.M. at 50, 665 P.2d at 312.
Id.
100 N.M. at 50-51, 665 P.2d at 312-13.
Id. at 51, 665 P.2d at 313; State v. Barela, 95 N.M. 349, 622 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Ortiz, 92 N.M. 166, 584 P.2d 1306, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 79, 582 P.2d 1292
State v. Tixier, 89 N.M. 297, 551 P.2d 987 (Ct. App. 1976).
100 N.M. at 51, 665 P.2d at 313.
Id.
Id.
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H. CustodialInterference
In State v. Whiting," 9 the court held that a custodial parent may be
subject to criminal sanctions for custodial interference.' 20 Whiting involved a divorce decree in which the court awarded joint custody of two
children to the mother, Nicolette Whiting, and itself; Whiting had physical
custody, but the children remained wards of the court and in the court's
legal custody. The court also ordered that the children not be removed
from its jurisdiction without court order. ' 2' Whiting began preparations
to move one child to London, England, and was charged with and convicted of custodial interference. 122 The court of appeals upheld the conviction based upon violation of the order not to remove the children from
the jurisdiction:
The court order in this case provided that the children were not to
be removed from the jurisdiction without the court's permission.
Consequently, defendant had no legal right to remove her child from
the jurisdiction at the time and in the manner stated in the charging
instruments, and violation2 3of that order subjected her to the criminal
sanctions of § 30-4-4(A).
The majority of the opinion, however, was devoted to justifying the
propriety of an order of joint custody in the mother and the court. The
joint custody statute refers to "an order of the court awarding custody of
a minor to both parties."'2 4 Yet the court found "nothing in the statute
[that] indicates that the authority granted the district court in §40-4-)
7(B)(4) to fashion a 'just and proper' custody order inhibits its authority
to award joint custody to one parent, and retain joint custody in the
court."' 25 A court may make separate orders of physical and legal custody.' 26 A court is a proper entity in which to vest custody because, for
the purposes of the Children's Code, "'legal custody' means a legal status
created by the order of the court . ..that vests in a person or agency
" '"
* the right and duty to protect, train and discipline the child. ....
'Person' means an individual or any other form of entity recognized by
law,"128 which would include a district court.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

100 N.M. 447, 671 P.2d 1158 (Ct. App. 1983).
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
100 N.M. at 448, 671 P.2d at 1159.
Id.
Id.at 449, 671 P.2d at 1160.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-9.1(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1983) (emphasis added).
100 N.M. at 449, 671 P.2d at 1160.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-4-9.1(C) (Repi. Pamp. 1983).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-3(J) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
Id. § 32-1-3(K).
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While the title and no doubt the basic focus of the statute is to prevent
kidnapping by the non-custodial parent, the functional language of the
statute could render either parent liable. "Custodial interference consists
of the taking from this state . . . a child . . . permanently or for a
protracted period, knowing that he has no legal right to do so." '29 Interestingly, the court's opinion indicates that the acts that rendered Whiting
liable were her preparations to remove one of the children, and not an
actual removal.130 Yet the conviction was on custodial interference, rather
than on attempt to commit custodial interference.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-JUVENILE LAW
The supreme court grappled with a section of the Children's Code 3'
in State v. Doe.'32 The question raised was whether the children's court
could transfer a child to the district court when there was evidence that
the child may be amenable to treatment. 3' 3 The statute in question in this
case, section 32-1-30, must be distinguished from the general transferstatute, section 32-1-29. The general transfer statute requires that a child
be transferred only if he is not amenable to treatment.134 Section 32-130 operates "notwithstanding the provisions of Section 32-1-29, N.M.
Stat. Ann. 1978," and specifically provides that a child can be transferred
at fifteen years if the criminal act is murder or at sixteen years if the
criminal act is assault with intent to commit a violent felony,. kidnapping,
aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, felony criminal sexual
penetration, robbery, aggravated burglary, or aggravated arson.1 35 If one
of these specific felonies is involved, the court must consider whether
the child is amenable to treatment or rehabilitation; the court need not
find a lack of amenability. Thus, section 32-1-30, in conjunction with
section 32-1-29, sets up a discretionary standard when certain felonies
are at issue, and a required standard when other felonies are involved.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
State v. Dees 136 involved the construction of a constitutional provision.
Article II, section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that "no
129. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-4 (1980).
130. 100 N.M. at 448, 671 P.2d at 1159.
131. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§32-1-1 to -53 (Repl. Pamp. 1981 and Cum. Supp. 1984).
132. 100 N.M. 649, 674 P.2d 1109 (1983). See Note, The Transfer of a Child from Juvenile
Court to Adult Court: State v. Doe, 15 N.M.L. Rev. -_ (1985), in this issue.
133. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-30 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
134. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) is the general transfer statute permitting the
court to transfer a matter if a child is over 16 years of age, the conduct is a felony, a hearing is
held in conformity with the rules, there is proper notice, and the court finds inter alia that the child
is not amenable to treatment.
135. N.M. Stat. Ann § 32-1-30 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
136. 100 N.M. 252, 669 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1983).
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law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security
and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful
purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of
concealed weapons. "'37 Dees raised the issue of whether the statute prohibiting the carrying of a firearm into a licensed liquor establishment'3 8
violated article II, section 6. The court held that it did not. 3
Article II, section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution is a unique provision dissimilar to the second amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that the right of the people to keep and to bear
arms shall not be infringed. " The court found that the New Mexico
constitutional provision is broader than the second amendment's provision
because the second amendment is grounded on the notion of a civilian
militia.' 41 The New Mexico Constitution was amended in 1971 to add
the language that citizens have the right to bear arms not only for security
and defense but also for hunting and recreational purposes or other lawful
purposes.' 42 This amendment did not give one the absolute right to bear
arms, but rather a right that must be weighed against the reasonable
' Analogizing this case to the issue of fighting
regulations of the state. 43
words under the first amendment, the court held:
[W]hen the legislature perceives that the carrying of a firearm may
present a clear and present danger ... if mixed with the opportunity

for its bearer to succumb to the influence of intoxicating liquors, it
serves a legitimate goal in a constitutionally approved manner when
it regulates and limits an unfettered exercise of the citizen's right to
bear arms.'
V. SPECIFIC INTENT
In State v. Bejar,4' 5 the court held that possession of heroin with intent
to distribute includes the requirement that specific intent be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. This is not new law.'" What is interesting about this
case is that there was a very small amount of heroin present,' 4 7 a factor
which may be inconsistent with an intent to distribute. There were other
137. N.M. Const. art. II, §6.
138. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-3 (1978).
139. 100 N.M. at 255, 669 P.2d at 264.
140. See U.S. Const. amend II.
141. 100 N.M. at 253, 669 P.2d at 262.
142. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 6.
143. Dees, 100 N.M. at 255, 669 P.2d at 264 (citing United States v. Romero, 484 F.2d 1324,
1327 (10th Cir. 1973)).
144. 100 N.M. at 255, 669 P.2d at 264.
145. 101 N.M. 190, 679 P.2d 1288 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 189, 679 P.2d 1287
(1984).
146. See id. at 191, 679 P.2d at 1289.
147. Id.
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factors, however, that were inconsistent with personal use: additional
heroin had just been flushed down the toilet, and the defendant had three
sets of scales used for weighing heroin, packages of balloons, cash, tin
foil, and other items that were inconsistent with personal use.' 48 The
distinction between possession of a drug and possession with intent to
distribute may depend, then, not on quantity (although that is one factor),
but on the presence or absence of items tending to show that the defendant
had been preparing to sell the drugs.
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The New Mexico courts considered three cases this year dealing with
the jurisdictional exception to double jeopardy. The New Mexico Supreme
Court continued to hold that double jeopardy does not apply where a
lower court, not having jurisdiction to try the greater crime, renders a
decision on a lesser included offense.14 This exception to double jeopardy
has been recognized previously by the New Mexico Supreme Court in
State v. James50 and State v. Goodson, 5 ' and by the United States Supreme Court in Diaz v. United States.'52 In State v. Manzanares,,'" the
court of appeals reconsidered the jurisdictional exception in light of three
United States Supreme Court cases: Waller v. Florida,54
' Robinson v.
Neil, " and Illinois v. Vitale. 116
In Manzanares, the defendant was involved in a traffic accident which
resulted in a death. He was convicted of vehicular homicide in district
court after pleading guilty to several lesser included offenses in magistrate
court. The court of appeals reversed the vehicular homicide conviction,
holding that the jurisdictional exception was no longer viable in light of
Waller, Robinson, and Vitale. The New Mexico Supreme Court, however,
reversed the court of appeals, holding that James and Goodson were still
the law in the State of New Mexico.' 5 7 The court distinguished Vitale on
the basis that there was no showing that one court could not have heard
both counts; it distinguished Waller on the basis that the question in that
case was dual sovereignty between city and state, and not a jurisdictional
exception. ' The court held "reason and logic do not support a rule where
148. Id.
149. See State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983).
150. 93 N.M. 605, 603 P.2d 715 (1979).
151. 54 N.M. 184, 217 P.2d 262 (1950).
152. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
153. 100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983).
154. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
155. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
156. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
157. 100 N.M. at 622, 674 P.2d at 512.
158. Id.at 623, 674 P.2d at 513.
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one guilty of a crime of homicide by vehicle may escape a possible
sentence of three years imprisonment by the expedient of pleading guilty
to a charge of DWI or reckless driving," 15 9 but admitted that the situation
"could be avoided by a modicum of cooperation between prosecutors. " "
the defendant resisted an arrest executed by three
In State v. Padilla,161
officers. He pleaded guilty to the charge of resisting arrest in magistrate
court; he then moved to dismiss a pending district court charge of felony
battery on a police officer. The court of appeals rejected the state's argument that the defendant was being prosecuted in district court for
kicking one officer and in magistrate court for resisting the other two,
16 2
holding that the state could not break the offense into discrete parts. It
found that, under a factual analysis, the same facts would support a
conviction of both crimes, or under a statutory analysis, the same definition applied to both crimes. Double jeopardy, therefore, did attach. The
charges differed only in that battery of a police officer requires the resisting
person to reach the point of touching the police officer. The court of
appeals held that after Diaz v. United States 1 63 the jurisdictional exception
a viable rationale, "4 but the supreme court reversed this
was no longer
1 65
decision.
In State v. Fugate,166 the defendant was involved in a three-car accident
inflicting great bodily injury on an occupant of another car. He pleaded
nolo contendere to DWI and careless driving in municipal court. The
injured party ultimately died, and the defendant was then charged with
vehicular homicide. The court of appeals held that the United States
Supreme Court had unmistakably rejected the jurisdictional exception test
and reversed the conviction. It held that because defendant could have
been charged immediately with great bodily injury by vehicle, and because
the charge of great bodily injury by vehicle was as serious as a death by
67
vehicle charge, the "necessary facts" exception set out in Brown v. Ohio'
did not apply. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, holding that the jurisdictional exception still did apply and, thus,
159. 100 N.M. at624, 674 P.2d at514.
160. Id.
161. 101 N.M. 78, 678 P.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 101 N.M. 58, 678 P.2d 686 (1984).
162. Id. at 80, 678 P.2d at 708.
163. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
164. 101 N.M. at 81, 678 P.2d at 709.
165. 101 N.M. 58, 678 P.2d 686 (1984).
166. 101 N.M. 82, 678 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 101 N.M. 58, 678 P.2d 686 (1984),
affd by an equally divided court, 53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (U.S. March 26, 1985) (No. 83-6663).
167. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). Although the double jeopardy clause prohibits successive prosecution
and cumulative punishment for a greater and a lesser included offense, "[a]n exception may exist
where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional
facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the
exercise of due diligence." Id. at 168 n.7.
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it was not necessary to reach the necessary facts exception to double
jeopardy.'6 8 The United States Supreme Court, by an equally divided
court, recently affirmed the Fugate decision. 69
Manzanares,70 State v. Tanton, "' and State v. Tijerina"' recognized
that the necessity of applying the jurisdictional exception to double jeopardy could be avoided by a modicum of cooperation between prosecutors.
Manzanares rationalized, however, that "there does not seem to be a
practical way to enforce this type of cooperation. It can only be encouraged by the courts." 173 Tijerina discussed the balancing of interests between prosecutorial cooperation and defendants' exposure to double
jeopardy:
It should not be inferred from this opinion that this court intends to
encourage or approve piecemeal prosecution. Such disorderly criminal procedures involve a myriad of problems which threaten the
existence of our judicial system. The risk of prejudice to the accused,
and the waste of time inherent in multiple trials, both perpetuate
delays in the judicial process and unconscionable expenditures of
public funds, all of which could be avoided by prosecutors getting
their facts straight, their theories clearly in mind and trying all charges
together. 174
New Mexico district courts are courts of general jurisdiction and have
jurisdiction to hear the lesser-included offenses in any case.' 75 The policy
cited in Tijerina and followed by the court of appeals in Manzanares,
Padilla, and Fugate appears to be a sound policy.
VII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Statutory Exceptions
In State v. Roybal, 76
' a case involving the unlawful carrying of a firearm
into a liquor establishment, the defendant contended that the exceptions
77
contained in the statute constituted an essential element of the crime.
The jury instruction the court gave recited the statute but did not include
the categories of persons specifically exempted from its grasp. The defendant argued that the failure to instruct the jury on this element was
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

101 N.M. at 84, 678 P.2d at 712.
53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (U.S. March 26, 1985) (No. 83-6663).
100 N.M. 621, 674 P.2d 511 (1983).
88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975).
86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1973).
100 N.M. at 624, 674 P.2d at 514.
86 N.M. at 36, 519 P.2d at 132; see also Tanton, 88 N.M. at 336, 540 P.2d at 816.
N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13.
100 N.M. 155, 667 P.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 157, 667 P.2d at 464.
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jurisdictional and, therefore, reversible error. Appellate counsel, unable
to contact trial counsel, could not point to any evidence showing the
applicability of the exceptions to the defendant. New Mexico Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Walters held that "[i]t was never contemplated that
appellate counsel would be permitted to speculate about facts in order to
raise an issue that a transcript of the trial testimony 'might' develop or
support,"' 7 8 and that "the general rule is that a defendant must prove he
is within an exception to a penal statute in order to take advantage of
it. "179

In support of her holding, Judge Walters cited a New Mexico statute
and New Mexico jury instruction, both of which dealt with controlled
substances. 8 ° That statute provides that the defendant has the burden of
proving he is within an exception to the statute. The Committee Commentary to the Uniform Jury Instructions clarifies that
[a]lthough the statute states that the burden of proof is on the defendant, such burden never shifts from the state in a criminal trial.
The defendant has the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to raise the issue of the exception or exemption, and then the
state must disprove the existence or validity of such exception or
exemption beyond a reasonable doubt.""'
Judge Walters' holding that a defendant must prove the exception applies
to him, therefore, would appear to be in error as a general proposition.
In the 1971 case of State v. James,18 2 the court held that it was error
to instruct the jury that defendant was presumed sane until disproved by
a preponderance of the evidence: the defendant merely had to present
evidence reasonably tending to support the fact of insanity to be entitled
to a jury instruction on insanity.8 3 This holding was cited in State v.
Wilson,' which supported James while adding that the presumption of
5
insanity remains throughout, and overruled State v. Torres, which held
that it was incorrect to place the burden of the defendant's sanity on the
' Once the defendant raises the issue of the applicability of an
state. 86
exemption, exception, or defense with sufficient evidence to create a jury
issue, the state has the burden of disproving its applicability, and the
burden of proof never shifts.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-37 (Repl. Pamp. 1980) and N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 36.43.
Committee Commentary, U.J.I. Crim. 36.43.
83 N.M. 263, 490 P.2d 1236 (Ct.App. 1971).
Id. at266, 490 P.2d at 1239 (citing State v.Martinez, 30 N.M. 178, 230 P.2d 379 (1924)).
85 N.M. 552, 514 P.2d 603 (1973).
82 N.M. 422, 483 P.2d 303 (1971).
Id. at 424, 483 P.2d at 305.
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B. Depraved Mind
In State v. McCrary,87
' the supreme court dealt with the "depraved
mind" definition of murder. ' It held that a defendant must have subjective
knowledge that (1) his conduct was very risky, and (2) under circumstances known to the defendant, he should have realized the high degree
of risk.
In McCrary, the defendants attended a carnival and thought they had
been cheated out of sixty-four dollars. As a means of revenge, they
returned to the carnival with several rifles and a shotgun and shot at
carnival tractor trailers and cabs. They claimed to have been aiming at
the tires, although no bullets hit the tires, but many hit the cabs and
trailers. One of these bullets entered the sleeping compartment of a cab
and hit the victim in the head, killing her.
The defendants claimed that the subjective knowledge required was
subjective knowledge that the victim was asleep in the cab. The court
held that N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.05189 requires that the "[d]efendants did
not have to actually know that [the victim] DeGracia was in the sleeper
compartment. Rather, sufficient subjective knowledge exists if the defendants' conduct was very risky, and under the circumstances known to
defendants they should have realized this very high degree of risk. "
The court has consistently refused to elaborate on the definition of
"depraved mind." Uniform Jury Instruction 2.05, listing essential elements of an act greatly dangerous to life, requires that:
... 3. The act of the defendant was greatly dangerous to the lives
of others, indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life;
4. The defendant knew that his act was greatly dangerous to the
lives of others. 9'
This jury instruction, however, does not define "depraved mind." The
court held, in somewhat circular reasoning, that knowing one's act is
greatly dangerous to the lives of others is the standard for proving the
defendant's culpable knowledge for a depraved mind. 92 The previous
year, in State v. Sena, 9' 3 the court upheld a district court's refusal of a
tendered jury instruction that would define "depraved mind" on the ground
that "[t]he submitted instruction contained a particular limitation which
187. 100 N.M. 671, 675 P.2d 120 (1984).
188. The "depraved mind" definition of murder is murder based on acts greatly dangerous to the
lives of others, indicating a depraved mind. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
189. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.05.
190. 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122 (emphasis in original).
191. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.05.
192. 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122.
193. 99 N.M. 272, 657 P.2d 128 (1983).
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does not accurately reflect state law."' 94 Sena held that intent to kill just
one person was not incompatible with a depraved mind, in response to
the defendant's contention that an intent to kill one particular person
would remove the act from this class.
95
Shortly after McCrary, the court again held in State v. Chavez' that
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.05 was not confusing and that it was error for the
trial court to grant a new trial on that ground. In Chavez, instructions on
19 6
premeditated murder and depraved mind murder were given. The trial
court granted a new trial, which the state appealed first to the court of
appeals and then to the supreme court. The supreme court remanded,
inter alia, for the trial court to set forth more fully its grounds for a new
trial. 197 The trial court listed as a ground, jury "confusion [which] was
compounded by Instructions No. 2 and No. 6 since there is no definition
of 'depraved mind' making the distinction between the alternative theories
difficult if not impossible to determine." 98 The state again appealed to
the court of appeals, which affirmed, determining that "on retrial the trial
court will have the opportunity to correct faulty or confusing instructions."'" The supreme court leapt to defend the clarity of U.J.I. Crim.
2.05, holding that "[t]he court of appeals is to follow the jury instructions
promulgated by the supreme court; they are not free to abolish uniform
jury instructions approved by this court."" Thus, the trial court erred
2
in finding that the jury instructions were confusing. "'
C. Essential Elements
02
The New Mexico appellate courts decided three cases this year that
appear to halt a trend of willingness to reverse for errors in jury instructions, at least where the error does not concern an essential element of
°
the crime upon which a defendant is convicted.2 3
2 the supreme court held that the failure to give N.M.
In State v. Doe,
U.J.I. Crim. 1.50, the general criminal intent instruction, is not juris194. 99 N.M. at274-75, 657 P.2d at 130-31.
195. 101 N.M. 136, 679 P.2d 804 (1984).
196. 101 N.M. at137, 679 P.2d at805.
197. 98 N.M. 682, 652 P.2d 232 (1982).
198. 101 N.M. at137, 679 P.2d at805.
199. Id. at143, 679 P.2d at811.
200. 101 N.M. at 139, 679 P.2d at807 (citation omitted).
201. Id.
202. State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 481, 672 P.2d 654 (1983); State v. Southerland, 100 N.M. 591,
673 P.2d 1324 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 241 (1983); and State v. Jackson,
100 N.M. 487, 672 P.2d 660 (1983).
203. That trend was established in State v. Curlee, 98 N.M. 576, 651 P.2d 111 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 576, 651 P.2d 636 (1982), and State v. Otto, 98 N.M. 734, 652 P.2d 756 (Ct.
App. 1982).
204. 100 N.M. 481, 672 P.2d 654 (1983).
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dictional error that may be raised on appeal for the first time.2 °5 In Doe,
the defendant was convicted of the delinquent act of second degree murder.2' At trial, the defendant neither submitted U.J.I. Crim. 1.50, which
the use note requires to be given, nor objected to the court's failure to
give the instruction. On appeal, Doe claimed that general intent is an
essential element and that the failure to give the instruction was jurisdictional error .2 7 The court of appeals reversed the conviction based on
the trial court's failure to give U.J.I. Crim. 1.50 on general criminal
intent .2" The supreme court reversed the court of appeals; it found that
failure to give the instruction was not reversible error for two reasons.
First, the court disapproved of the court of appeals' treatment of use notes:
Both Doe and the court of appeals' opinion rely on State v. Curlee
...and State v. Otto [citations omitted] for the proposition that
failure to follow the Use Note for a Uniform Jury Instructions is
jurisdictional error ...
The failure to give a definitional jury instruction is not error ...
The Court of Appeals in Curlee determined that because the Use
Note to UJI Crim. 2.11 required that UJI Crim. 1.50 must be given,
failure to give UJI Crim. 1.50 in an unaltered form was reversible
error. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals in Otto, relied on Curlee,
and held that the failure to give UJI Crim. 1.50 is jurisdictional and
reversible error. . . . [Here], the Court of Appeals now goes further
and holds that UJI Crim. 1.50 is jurisdictional because the Use Note
says that it "must be given."
[Tihe jury instructions must be considered as a whole, and if the
jury instructions substantially follow the language of the statute or
use equivalent language, then they are sufficient. The language in a
Use Note, like a definitional jury instruction, cannot elevate a jury
instruction to the status of an essential element.2°
Second, the supreme court determined that the 1980 amendment to
N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1 eliminated the requirement of malice for murder2 0
205. Id. at 483, 672 P.2d at 656. Jurisdictional error is error so fundamental that the trial court
is deprived of jurisdiction to enter a judgment on a matter; it may be raised for the first time on
appeal. State v. Southerland, 100 N.M. 591, 673 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M.
689, 675 P.2d 241 (1983); State v. Walsh, 81 N.M. 65, 463 P.2d 41 (ct. App. 1969); State v.
Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1969).
206. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984); N.M. Stat. Ann. §32-1-3(0) (Repl.
Pamp. 1981).
207. 100 N.M. at 483, 672 P.2d at 656.
208. Id.
209. Id. (emphasis in original).
210. 1980 N.M. Laws ch. 21, § 1 changed the definition of murder. 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 303,
§2-1 had defined murder as "the unlawful killing of one human being by another with malice
aforethought, either express or implied, by any of the means with which death may be caused."
1980 N.M Laws ch. 21, § I amended the definition to read "the killing of one human being by
another, without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be
caused," and in addition repealed N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-2 (1978), which defined malice.
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and thus eliminated the need for a jury instruction on general criminal
intent:
[T]he Legislature ...has eliminated the requirement that a defendant commit a second degree murder with "general criminal intent." Rather, both first and second degree murder now require the
specific intent set forth in the statute. Second degree murder now
occurs when "a person * * * kills another human being... [knowing] that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm. . . .There is no requirement for general criminal intent."'
This holding in Doe effectively overrules the use note to N.M. U.J.I.
Crim. 1.50.
State v. Southerland 12 provides a good analysis of jurisdictional error
in jury instructions. In Southerland, the court of appeals held that the
giving of a jury instruction on second degree murder which differed from
the uniform jury instruction2 13 was not jurisdictional error when the defendant was found guilty of the greater crime of attempted first degree
murder.
Southerland held up a convenience store; in the course of the robbery,
he discharged a .38 pistol into the clerk's nose from a distance of twelve
inches. The clerk survived, and Southerland was charged with armed
robbery and attempted first degree murder. He was convicted on both
charges. Southerland appealed two jury instructions. He appealed the
refusal to give an instruction on aggravated assault as a lesser included
offense. He also claimed the jury instruction that was given on the lesser
included offense of attempted second degree murder, not objected to
below, was jurisdictional error.214
The rationale of jurisdictional error is that "a court would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate guilt and sentence a defendant when it does not
submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the only offense on which
the conviction could rest." 2' 15 The court of appeals reasoned that "it is
difficult to see how the court lacked authority to proceed by making a
mistake in an instruction on an offense for which [the defendant] was not
where there
convicted." 2 16 Jurisdictional error was previously found only
2 7
was a complete failure to instruct on essential elements. " The court of
appeals took notice of the recent trend to find jurisdictional error in the
failure to give the correct jury instruction as well as the failure to give
211. 100 N.M. at 484, 672 P.2d at 657 (citations omitted).
212. 100 N.M. 591, 673 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 241 (1983).
213. N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 2.10.
214. 100 N.M. at 593-94, 673 P.2d at 1326-27.
215. Id. at 594, 673 P.2d at 1327.
216. Id.
217. See State v. Cardona, 86 N.M. 373, 524 P.2d 989 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372,
524 P.2d 988 (1974); State v. Puga, 85 N.M. 204, 510 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1973).
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any instruction, but also foresaw the supreme court's treatment of the
issue in Doe. The court, therefore, found as an alternate ground for
affirmance that "error in an instruction on a lesser offense is harmless
and non-prejudicial where defendant is convicted of the greater offense. "218
Additionally, the court of appeals noted that the instruction the trial
court gave was more favorable to the defendant than N.M. U.J.I. Crim.
2.10, because the trial court defined intent as "an intent to kill or do
great bodily harm" rather than "knowledge that one's acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. 12 9 Finally, the court of appeals
found no ground for the defendant's requested instruction on aggravated
assault. An instruction on a lesser offense should be given only when
there is evidence that the lesser offense is the highest degree of the crime
committed.22 ° Here, the defendant discharged a large pistol directly into
the clerk's face at close range. There was no evidence to indicate that
the defendant intended anything less than murder.22'
The decision in Southerland appears to be at odds with the decision
in State v. Jackson,22 2 where the supreme court considered an identical
jury instruction and found the language constituted jurisdictional error.
In Jackson, however, the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder, the charge contained in the incorrect instruction. Jackson and the
victim had fought in a restaurant, and Jackson fatally stabbed the victim. 223
He was charged with first degree murder, and at trial, the court gave an
instruction on the lesser included offense of second degree murder.224 The
jury instruction for second degree murder was the same one given in
Southerland, misdefining intent. 225 Jackson was found guilty of second
degree murder, and he appealed the conviction based on error, inter alia,
in the instruction on second degree murder.
218. 100 N.M. at 595, 673 P.2d at 1328; see also State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 557 P.2d
1095 (1976); State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1977); State v. Scott, 90 N.M.
256, 561 P.2d 1349 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486 (1977). The court of
appeals noted that State v. Reynolds, 98 N.M. 527, 650 P.2d 811 (1982), overruled on other grounds
in Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982), substantially overrules these cases, but
distinguished Reynolds on two grounds. Reynolds involved a complete failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense, not amisinstruction. Additionally, in Reynolds, a proper request for a jury instruction
was made and refused. Southland made no such request.
219. Id. at 595, 673 P.2d at 1328.
220. State v. Martinez, 98 N.M. 17, 644 P.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Romero, 94 N.M.
22, 606 P.2d 1116 (Ct. App. 1980).
221. 100 N.M. at 596, 673 P.2d at 1329.
222. 100 N.M. 487, 672 P.2d 660, rev'g 99 N.M. 478, 660 P.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1983).
223. Id. at 489, 672 P.2d at 662.
224. Id.
225. "[A]n intent to kill or do great bodily harm" rather than "knowledge that one's acts create
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." Southerland, 100 N.M. at 593, 673 P.2d at
1326.
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The supreme court overturned Jackson's conviction and remanded the
case for a new trial. 2 6 The supreme court held that the instruction given
on second degree murder constituted fundamental error because the instruction failed to instruct the jury properly on the necessary elements of
second degree murder.227 In dissent, Justice Stowers objected to the manner in which the issue was presented to the court. The only question
appealed was whether the trial court's refusal to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter was error. The court of appeals raised the issue of the jury
instruction in a dissent to the affirmance of the trial court's conviction,
followed by the defendant's presentation of the question in his motion
for rehearing.228 The majority defended its consideration of the question,
admitting that while normally a party cannot appeal a jury instruction not
objected to below,229 "there are exceptions. It is within the province of
this court, in its discretion, to prevent
2 30 injustice where a fundamental right
of the accused has been violated.
Jackson and State v. Doe were decided only one day apart. While the
court's treatment of the two cases may seem disparate, the explanation
may lie in the fact that the error in Jackson, even though possibly benefiting the defendant, was in the instruction setting out the elements of the
charge upon which Jackson was convicted, while in Doe, the error was
in an instruction which did not set out essential elements of the offense.
D. Self-Defense
In State v. Chavez,23 ' the supreme court affirmed the trial court's refusal
of the defendant's requested jury instruction on self-defense. In so doing,
the court articulated an objective test for evaluating the defendant's uncorroborated claim of self-defense.232 The court looked to the definition
of felony murder as a death committed during the commission of a felony
by activity "inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life. 2 33 To
the court, participation in such activity prevents the defendant from proving "that the killing resulted from fear, and that the defendant acted as
226. State v. Jackson, 100 N.M. 487, 672 P.2d 660, rev'g 99 N.M. 478, 660 P.2d 120 (Ct. App.
1983).
227. 100 N.M. at 489-90, 672 P.2d at 662-63.
228. 100 N.M. at 490, 672 P.2d at 663 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
229. See State v. Noble, 90 N.M. 360, 563 P.2d 1153 (1977).
230. 100 N.M. at 489, 672 P.2d at 662 (citing State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 128 P.2d 459
(1942); and State v. Garcia, 19 N.M. 414, 143 P.2d 1012, reh'g granted, 19 N.M. 420, 143 P.
1014 (1914)).
231. 99 N.M. 609, 661 P.2d 887 (1983).
232. The court noted that the only evidence to support defendant's claim of self-defense was the
defendant's own testimony. While the court did not elaborate, it clearly attached significance to the
lack of corroborating evidence. See id. 99 N.M. at 611, 661 P.2d at 889.
233. 99 N.M. at 611, 661 P.2d at 889; State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321,
1324 (1977).
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a reasonable person would act under the circumstances. "234 The impression the court leaves is that no self-defense instruction is available to a
defendant who caused death while committing a dangerous felony.
E. Defense of Property
In State v. Trammel,235 the supreme court ruled that a jury instruction
on defense of property was not available to a defendant who used force
to resist the lawful termination of his electric service. 236 The court derived
from a 1917 New Mexico Supreme Court case23 7 the proposition that an
individual may not use force to defend property where the attempt to
dispossess is lawful.238 The court did not articulate the significance of the
defendant's intent; there is the possibility that a defendant would believe
an attempt to dispossess to be unlawful. The court, therefore, left the
ultimate question of intent, or the defendant's knowledge, for future courts
to resolve.
F. Mental Illness
The court of appeals considered the use of the recently approved jury
instructions regarding the defense of mental illness239 in State v. Page2"
and concluded that N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.02,241 determining mental illness, may be given in the absence of an insanity defense. Page was
convicted of burglary 242 arising from a fight in his ex-wife's house. He
claimed that back pain led him to take pain pills, and in addition, that
he had been drinking and smoking marijuana during that day, all of which
rendered him unable to form the requisite specific intent to commit burglary.243 At trial, the defendant tendered U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 (defense of
234. 99 N.M. at 611, 661 P.2d at 889 (quoting State v. Montano, 95 N.M. 233, 620 P.2d 887
(Ct. App. 1980)).
235. 100 N.M. 479, 672 P.2d 652 (1983).
236. Trammel requested a jury instruction on defense of property based on N.M. U.J.I. Crim.
41.50.

237.
238.
239.
240.

State v. McCracken, 22 N.M. 588, 166 P. 1174 (1917).
100 N.M. at 481, 672 P.2d at 654.
N.M. Stat. Ann. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 to 41.03.
100 N.M. 788, 676 P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1984).

241. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.02 states:

The defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the crime if a substantial
disorder of thought, mood, or behavior impaired his judgment at the time of
the commission of the offense.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act
charged you may find him guilty but mentally ill at the time of the commission
of the offense.
242. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
243. Under New Mexico law, burglary is a specific intent crime. State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187,
539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976); State
v. Ortega, 79 N.M. 707, 448 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1968).
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insanity), U.J.I. Crim. 41.02 (determining mental illness), 2" and U.J.I.
Crim. 41.11 (inability to form intent). 245 The court refused U.J.I. Crim.
41.00, defense of insanity, because the notice requirements of N.M. R.
Crim. P. 352' had not been complied with, 247 but gave instructions on
determining mental illness and ability to form intent.24 s
The court of appeals upheld the conviction and the trial court's use of
the jury instructions. It noted that the defendant's only objection to the
jury instructions below was to the refusal to submit U.J.I. Crim. 41.00.
A defendant cannot appeal the use of a jury instruction that he submitted
himself or to which he failed to object. 249 The trial court was also correct
in giving U.J.I. Crim. 41.02 without allowing the defense of insanity or
also giving U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 because this use is specifically approved
by the uniform jury instruction committee.25 ° Neither does the fact that
the statute establishing the defense of "guilty but mentally ill"'25' specifies

that the instruction on guilty but mentally ill should be given when a
defendant has asserted the defense of insanity preclude its use in other
appropriate contexts."
VIII. DEFENSES
In two cases decided during the survey year, the courts considered the
defenses of mistake and impossibility. In State v. Gonzales,253 the case
involving the defense of mistake, the court of appeals examined the factual
context upon which the defense may be used. In State v. Lopez, 254 the
case involving the defense of impossibility, the supreme court abolished
the common law distinction between factual and legal impossibility in
attempt crimes; in its place, the court adopted the more modern Model
Penal Code approach, requiring the factfinder to determine the element
of intent from the defendant's point of view.
244. Since the state did not tender U.J.I. Crim. 41.02, the court assumed that Page did (although
the record did not indicate that he had). See 100 N.M. at 792, 676 P.2d at 1357.
245. 100 N.M. at 790, 676 P.2d at 1355.
246. "Notice of 'Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity at the Time of Commission of an Offense'
must be given at the arraignment or within 20 days thereafter.... N.M. R. Crim. P. 35(a)(1).
247. 100 N.M. at 790, 792, 676 P.2d at 1355, 1357.
248. Id.
249. 100 N.M. at 792, 676 P.2d at 1357.
250. "The committee believed that this instruction should also be given if the jury has been
presented an instruction on inability to form a deliberate or specific intent to commit an offense."
N.M. U.J.I. 41.02, Committee Commentary.
251. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
252. 100 N.M. 791, 676 P.2d at 1356.
253. 99 N.M. 734, 663 P.2d 710 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 622 P.2d 645, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 173 (1983).
254. 100 N.M. 291, 669 P.2d 1086 (1983).
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A. Mistake
In State v. Gonzales,255 the court of appeals decided to what facts the
defense of mistake of fact may apply. Gonzales was the executive director
of the Santa Fe Community Action Program ("the Program"). In October
1977, he and his wife attended a conference in Philadelphia. His wife
was not a Program employee, but Gonzales paid for his wife's airfare to
Philadelphia with Program funds. He was charged with embezzlement
for expending state monies on his wife's airplane ticket.256
Gonzales raised the defense of mistake of fact, claiming that he believed
that the Program actually owed him money. The trial court refused the
defendant's jury instruction on mistake of fact. Judge Donnelly noted
that mistake of fact applies when a "defendant entertained a belief of
fact that, if true, would make his conduct lawful." 257 Gonzales did not
claim that he believed that if he was owed the money, then he had lawful
authority to use the money for payment of expenses of his wife in accompanying him to Philadelphia.25 8 The factual question of whether he
was owed money by the Program, therefore, did not affect the legality
of using Program funds for the benefit of his wife.
B. Impossibility
In State v. Lopez,259 the supreme court modified the common law
doctrine of impossibility. Lopez had received $100 from an informant
for a substance that Lopez falsely'represented to be cocaine. Lopez was
charged with attempt to traffic a controlled substance." The supreme
court rejected the common law distinction between factual and legal
impossibility and held that a defendant's criminal intent (or lack thereof)
controls. The court noted that "[t]he doctrine of impossibility abounds
with confusion" because of the difficulty of determining whether a particular situation falls within the category of "legal impossibility" (the
act, if completed, would not be criminal) or "factual impossibility" (it
is impossible to complete the crime because of a physical or factual
condition unknown to the defendant).26 Adopting the Ninth Circuit's
position in United States v. Quijada,262 the court held the test to be one
of the defendant's intent, or viewing the facts as the defendant supposes
255. 99 N.M. 734, 663 P.2d 710 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 622 P.2d 645, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 173 (1983).
256. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-16-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
257. 99 N.M. at 736, 663 P.2d at 712.
258. Id. at 736-37, 663 P.2d at 712-13.
259. 100 N.M. 291, 669 P.2d 1086 (1983).
260. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-20 (Repl. Panp. 1980).
261. 100 N.M. at 292, 669 P.2d at 1087.
262. 588 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1978).
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them to be. 2 63 Either Lopez intended to sell cocaine and completed sufficient overt acts in furtherance thereof, constituting attempt to traffic in
a controlled substance, or Lopez committed fraud by selling a substance
he knew was not cocaine, but intended that the informant believe it to
be cocaine.2' The court did not discuss the possibility of fraud, apparently
assuming the defendant thought the substance was cocaine. "When the
265
objective is clearly criminal, impossibility is not a proper defense.

263. 100 N.M. at 292-93, 669 P.2d at 1087-88.
264. Id. at 292, 669 P.2d at 1087.
265. Id. at 293, 669 P.2d at 1088.

